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Abstract
Reduced social motivation is hypothesised to underlie social behavioural symptoms of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). 
The extent to which rewarding social stimuli are granted privileged access to awareness in ASD is currently unknown. We use 
continuous flash suppression to investigate whether individuals with and without ASD show privileged access to awareness 
for social over nonsocial rewarding scenes that are closely matched for stimulus features. Strong evidence for a privileged 
access to awareness for rewarding social over nonsocial scenes was observed in neurotypical adults. No such privileged access 
was seen in ASD individuals, and moderate support for the null model was noted. These results suggest that the purported 
deficits in social motivation in ASD may extend to early processing mechanisms.
Keywords Awareness · Social motivation · Reward · Autism
Introduction
Given the brain’s capacity limitations, incoming sensory 
information must be selected for further processing. Social 
stimuli, such as faces and bodies, attract attention (Binde-
mann et al. 2005; Crouzet et al. 2010; Downing et al. 2004), 
suggesting that they are prioritised in the competition for 
selection. When presented in simple arrays, social images 
attract attention more quickly than other objects, even in 
young infants (Gluckman and Johnson 2013). However, we 
rarely view social information in isolation; it is more typi-
cally processed alongside surrounding contextual informa-
tion. When presented in complex visual scenes, social infor-
mation has been found to capture attention rapidly in typical 
observers (Fletcher-Watson et al. 2008; Birmingham et al. 
2008a, b, 2009). Using eye-movement measures, the bias 
towards social information in natural images has been found 
as early as the first saccade (Fletcher-Watson et al. 2008), 
despite it not being the most visually salient information in 
the scene (Birmingham et al. 2009).
The extent to which social stimuli capture attention may 
depend on characteristics of the observer. Individuals with 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) display characteristic 
abnormalities in their social interactions and communication 
(American Psychiatric Association 2013). There is evidence 
to suggest that rapid orienting to social stimuli is disrupted 
in ASD (Dawson et al. 1998; Klin et al. 2009). The social 
motivation theory of autism suggests that social stimuli elicit 
lower levels of reward in ASD than in typically developing 
individuals (Chevallier et al. 2012). For example, using an 
incentive delay task, Demurie et al. (2011) found that chil-
dren with ASD responded faster to monetary than social 
rewards, whereas typically developing children responded 
equally quickly to both reward types. Adults with ASD have 
been reported to be slower in orienting to social stimuli 
when presented within an array containing nonsocial stimuli 
(Wang et al. 2014), though this effect is particularly strong 
when the competing nonsocial stimuli pertain to the cir-
cumscribed interests commonly noted in ASD (Sasson and 
Touchstone 2014). Notably, the evidence discussed above 
has presented stimuli at or above the threshold of awareness.
In typical observers, the rapid orienting response to social 
stimuli may occur early in the visual processing stream. 
Faces and bodies are not only granted prioritised access to 
attention, they are also granted prioritised access to visual 
awareness (Stein et al. 2012). To measure access to visual 
awareness, continuous flash suppression (CFS) has been 
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commonly used, in which an image presented to one eye 
is suppressed for a prolonged period of time by a dynamic 
mask presented to the other eye (Tsuchiya and Koch 2005). 
The time it takes for a stimulus to enter awareness (or break 
suppression) is measured, and is thought to index stimulus 
salience (Stein et al. 2011a). For example, preferential selec-
tion of threat-related information has been suggested to hold 
an evolutionary advantage, and indeed, fearful faces break 
suppression more quickly than neutral faces (Gray et al. 
2013; Hedger et al. 2016). Despite upright faces emerging 
from suppression more quickly than inverted faces (Gray 
et al. 2013), and faces emerging more quickly than objects 
(Stein et al. 2012), to date, no study has tested whether 
rewarding social information is granted privileged access to 
awareness when presented in complex natural scenes.
Recently, it has been found that individuals with ASD 
display typical prioritisation of highly simplified ‘proto-
face’ stimuli, in both attention (using an attentional-cueing 
paradigm; Shah et al. 2013) and visual awareness (using 
CFS; Akechi et al. 2015). However, using more natural 
face images in CFS, Akechi et al. (2014) found non-typical 
responses to eye-gaze in individuals with ASD. Typically 
developing adolescents showed a standard eye-gaze effect 
(Stein et al. 2011b), whereby direct-gaze faces broke sup-
pression more quickly than averted-gaze faces. However, 
adolescents with ASD did not show a direct-gaze preference 
in CFS, suggesting the mechanism for deficits in eye-gaze 
detection in ASD occur early in the visual processing stream 
(Akechi et al. 2014).
Here, we ask whether rewarding social scenes are granted 
privileged access to awareness when compared to non-social 
scenes. We presented positively valenced visual scenes out-
side of conscious awareness using CFS and measured, using 
response times, how quickly the scenes emerged from sup-
pression. In Experiment 1, we addressed this question in a 
sample of typical adults; in Experiment 2, we tested indi-
viduals with ASD. Given the inherent difficulty in match-
ing samples effectively (Blackford 2006; Facon et al. 2011), 
and the known problems in statistical covariation methods 
(Miller and Chapman 2001), we have reported these sam-
ples over two identical experiments. We have complemented 
traditional null significance hypothesis testing (NHST) with 
corresponding Bayesian analyses, which allowed us to quan-





Thirty-eight naïve adults (Mean age = 21.16; SD = 3.77; 
11 males) with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acu-
ity participated in Experiment 1. For both experiments, 
ethical clearance was granted by the University of Read-
ing research ethics committee, and all participants gave 
informed consent.
Materials
The 16 images used were taken from the International Affec-
tive Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al. 2008) and publicly 
available images from the internet (free for non-commercial 
reuse). Images were selected based on their valence and 
arousal ratings from previous studies on neurotypical uni-
versity students of both sexes (N = 145). Both social images 
(M = 6.39, SD = .46) and non-social images (M = 6.32, 
SD = .43) were rated similarly positive, and arousal ratings 
were comparable for social images (M = 4.35, SD = .71) and 
non-social images (M = 4.10, SD = .43). All images also had 
canonical orientation, were presented in grey-scale, and were 
matched on mean luminance and root-mean-square contrast. 
The scenes were prepared and presented using MATLAB 
(Mathworks) with PsychToolbox extensions (Brainard 1997; 
Pelli 1997). Local low-level stimulus properties were con-
trolled for using an additional condition in which the images 
were presented with negated contrast, and spatial inversion 
(Fig. 1a). These manipulations reduce face recognition accu-
racy (Galper 1970; Yin 1969), and they also delay (Torralba 
and Sinha 2001) and increase thresholds (Liu-Shuang et al. 
2015) for face detection. They are also thought to disrupt 
recognition of complex scenes; performance on matching 
tasks is significantly disrupted by scene inversion (Epstein 
et al. 2006), and the combination of negated contrast and 
spatial inversion has been found to significantly reduce face 
detection accuracy when faces are presented within a visual 
scene context (Torralba and Sinha 2001).
Procedure
Images of scenes (2.6° × 3.5° of visual angle at a viewing 
distance of 60 cm) were presented under interocular suppres-
sion using a mirror stereoscope. On each trial, a scene was 
presented to one eye, and a high-contrast mask pattern updat-
ing at 10 times/s was presented to the other eye (Fig. 1b). 
The contrast of the image was increased linearly over the 
first second to reduce the likelihood of break-through due to 
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onset transients; the images then remained at full contrast 
until the observer responded.
The position of the image was randomly assigned to the 
left or right of the visual field, and the position vertically 
within the visual field was randomly jittered on each trial. 
A binocularly viewed frame and fixation cross were used to 
facilitate convergence. Participants were required to indicate, 
using the arrow keys, which side of fixation they ‘detected 
anything other than noise’. They were also required to fixate 
on the fixation cross for the duration of the trial. Head move-
ments were controlled using a chin rest and forehead bar. 
Each participant completed six practice trials before com-
pleting the 256 trials of the experiment (two social content 
(social, nonsocial) × two stimulus manipulations (normal, 
manipulated) × eight images × eight repetitions), balanced 
across presentation location and eye.
Following the CFS experiment, participants rated the 
normal stimuli for valence and arousal. Each stimulus was 
presented twice—once with a nine point valence scale 
presented beneath it, and again with a nine point arousal 
scale. The scales were represented by manikins, which 
participants clicked on to convey their response (Bradley 
Fig. 1  a Complex visual scenes containing social information, or 
nonsocial information were presented normally, or manipulated (with 
negative contrast and spatially inverted). Example images (not used 
in the study) were taken from OASIS (Kurdi et  al. 2017). b Trial 
schematic. The target was presented to one eye, and random dynamic 
noise to the other. Participants selected the target location (left or 
right of fixation). c Arousal (top) and valence (bottom) ratings were 
taken for each image using Self Assessment Manikins (Bradley and 
Lang 1994)
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and Lang 1994; Fig. 1c). If participants failed to respond 
within 6 s the trial proceeded without a response.
Data Analysis
Mean response times were calculated from correct trials. 
Four individuals were excluded as they were at chance 
level on the location task. For the remaining participants, 
the number of incorrect trials were small (M = 3.46%), and 
did not differ over presentation conditions [F(3,99) = 2.28, 
p > .05]. Response times ± 3SDs from the mean for each 
observer were removed from further analysis (mean number 
of trials excluded = .57%) and did not differ over presenta-
tion conditions [F(3,99) = 2.36, p > .05]. Bayes factors were 
computed using JASP (Love et al. 2015) with default prior 
width; we report evidence that the data were more likely 
under the alternative model compared to the null model, 
and interpreted Bayes factors (BF) of < 3 as anecdotal, 3–10 
as substantial, 10–30 as strong, 30–100 as very strong, and 
> 100 as decisive evidence (Jeffereys 1961). In all Bayesian 
analyses reported, we included subject, age and gender as 
random factors.
Results and Discussion
Our sample rated social (valence: M = 6.29, SD = 1.18; 
arousal: M = 4.88, SD = .72) and non-social (valence: 
M = 5.83, SD = .6; arousal: M = 4.92, SD = .76) scenes 
similarly for both valence [t(14) = .96, p = .35], and arousal 
[t(14) = .10, p = .92]. This is unsurprising, given that the 
images were selected based on their similarity in these 
dimensions.
A 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA on the mean 
response times revealed a main effect of Social Content 
[F(1,33) = 12.96, p = .001, 휂2
p
= .28 ], whereby social stim-
uli were responded to more quickly than non-social stimuli. 
There was also a main effect of Stimulus Manipulation 
[F(1,33) = 4.78, p < .05, 휂2
p
= .13 ], whereby normal stimuli 
were responded to more quickly than manipulated stimuli. 
These main effects were qualified by a significant interac-
tion between Social Content and Stimulus Manipulation 
[F(1,33) = 16.41, p < .001, 휂2
p
= .33 ]. Pairwise contrasts 
revealed evidence for preferential access to awareness for 
social stimuli (social normal: M = 2.36, SD = .73; non-
social normal, M = 2.64, SD = .81; t(33) = 4.87, p < .001), 
but only when they were not manipulated (social manipu-
lated: M = 2.59, SD = .82; non-social manipulated: M = 2.64, 
SD = .89; t(33) = 1.06, p = .29; see Fig. 2a).
The results of the NHST ANOVA were complemented 
by a Bayes factor ANOVA (Rouder et al. 2012), which 
revealed evidence that each main effect model was pre-
ferred to the null model (Social Content: BF = 47.18; 
Stimulus Manipulation: BF = 2.79). However, the interac-
tion model (BF = 711.71) was strongly preferred over the 
combined main effects model (BF = 187.67), concurring 
with the repeated-measures NHST ANOVA and suggest-
ing that Social Content and Stimulus Manipulation interact 
in their effect on response times (see Fig. 2b, c).
Experiment 2
Results from Experiment 1 suggest that social scenes have 
privileged access to visual awareness. Given that simple 
social stimuli appear to access awareness normally in 
individuals with ASD (Akechi et al. 2015), but complex 
social stimuli do not (Akechi et al. 2014), we next explored 
the extent to which rewarding social scenes are granted 
Fig. 2  Results from Experiment 
1 (typical observers) analysed 
using: a null significance 
hypothesis testing, where *** 
denotes p < .001, ** denotes 
p < .01, * denotes p < .05. 
Error bars denote ± 1SEM; and 
sequential analysis from Bayes-
ian within participant t-tests 
for b social normal versus 
nonsocial normal and c social 
manipulated versus nonsocial 
manipulated comparisons
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Thirty naïve adults (Mean age = 37.19; SD = 13.73; 14 
males) with a DSM-IV TR based diagnosis of ASD from 
a recognised clinic were recruited through the Berkshire 
Autism Research Network database of research volunteers. 
As an additional check on diagnostic status, all participants 
filled in the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). All partici-
pants but one scored equal to or above the suggested diag-
nostic cut-off score of 26 on the AQ (Woodbury-Smith et al. 
2005). All participants were also assessed with the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al. 1999). 
Twenty of the participants met criteria for ASD according 
to the ADOS, while eight did not.1 Two individuals with-
drew from the ADOS as they found the process upsetting. 
To capture cognitive ability, 23 of the participants completed 
the Raven’s progressive matrices (Raven 1998). The remain-
ing seven were not tested due to an administrative error. 
This task estimates the participant’s cognitive ability as a 
percentile of the general population. The average percentile 
of these participants was 54.04 (SD = 28.66), suggesting 
that cognitive functioning of these participants as a group 
is comparable to neurotypical participants. Prior to testing, 
participants’ ability to binocularly fuse visual stimuli was 
tested using the RanDot graded circles test (Stereo Optical 
Company), which tests fine depth discrimination at different 
levels of stereopsis (400–20 s of arc). Three participants 
were excluded, as they did not reach the minimum threshold 
(400 s of arc). All other participants reached a minimum 
threshold of 70 s of arc.
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli and procedure were the same as Experiment 1.
Data Analysis
Mean response times were again calculated from correct tri-
als. The number of incorrect trials were small (M = 3.82%), 
and did not differ over presentation conditions [F(2.1, 
54.6) = 2.36, p > .1]. Response times ± 3SDs from the mean 
for each observer were removed from further analysis (mean 
number of trials excluded = 2.14%) and did not differ over 
presentation conditions [F(3,78) = .73, p > .5].
Results and Discussion
Our ASD sample rated social (valence: M = 5.78, SD = .64; 
arousal: M = 4.93, SD = .90) and non-social (valence: 
M = 6.13, SD = .75; arousal: M = 4.55, SD = .35) scenes 
similarly for both valence [t(14) = 1.03, p = .32], and arousal 
[t(14) = 1.12, p = .28].
A 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA on the mean 
response times revealed no main effect of Social Content 
[F(1,26) = .06, p = .81, 휂2
p
= .002 ], nor of Stimulus Manipu-
lation [F(1,26) = .24, p = .63, 휂2
p
= .009 ], and no interac-
tion between Social Content and Stimulus Manipulation 
[F(1,26) = .07, p = .79, 휂2
p
= .003 ] (Fig. 3a).
The results of the ANOVA were complemented by a 
Bayes factor ANOVA (Rouder et al. 2012) with default 
prior scales, which revealed evidence for the null model 
was strongly preferred to the main effects model (BF = .046) 
Fig. 3  Results from Experiment 
2 (ASD observers) analysed 
using: a null significance 
hypothesis testing, where *** 
denotes p < .001, ** denotes 
p < .01, * denotes p < .05. 
Error bars denote ± 1SEM; and 
sequential analysis from Bayes-
ian t-tests for b social normal 
versus nonsocial normal and c 
social manipulated versus non-
social manipulated comparisons
1 Results were near identical when these participants (or the partici-
pant not exceeding cutoff on the AQ) were excluded from the analy-
sis.
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and the interaction model (BF = .013). This concurs with the 
standard (NHST) repeated-measures ANOVA, and suggests 
strong evidence for the null model (see Fig. 3b,c).
General Discussion
In typical observers, social stimuli were found to break 
suppression more quickly than nonsocial stimuli; however, 
when manipulated (inverted and contrast negated), both 
stimulus types were equally slow to break suppression. 
Using the same experimental design, procedure, and setup, 
we then tested individuals with a diagnosis of ASD. In both 
the normal, and manipulated conditions, we found no effect 
of social content on time to break suppression. These results 
provide evidence that social stimuli enjoy privileged access 
to awareness over non-social images in typical observers, but 
this is not the case in observers with ASD.
The lack of a preference for social information in indi-
viduals with ASD was not due to participants having diffi-
culties fusing the stimuli in the stereoscope, as all included 
participants had good stereoscopic depth perception. As all 
other methodological details were the same as Experiment 1, 
these results suggest that individuals with ASD have a deficit 
in processing social stimuli at an early stage of the visual 
processing hierarchy. It has been suggested that individuals 
with ASD process ‘protofaces’ (basic face-like stimuli) in a 
similar way to typical participants (Shah et al. 2013; Akechi 
et al. 2015). However, using photographic images, no eye-
gaze effect was reported in individuals with ASD (Akechi 
et al. 2014). Our findings also suggest that the processing of 
complex rewarding social information outside of conscious 
awareness is aberrant in ASD.
Social reward signals play an important role from early 
development in facilitating learning (Wu et al. 2011). Lack 
of privileged access to these signals can arguably have an 
adverse effect on social learning, which in turn can lead to 
social behavioural difficulties often reported by individuals 
with ASD. A large number of studies have reported atypical 
processing of social stimuli in individuals with ASD (Chita-
Tegmark 2016; Scott-Van Zeeland et al. 2010; Izuma et al. 
2008; Kohls et al. 2012; Richey et al. 2013; Delmonte et al. 
2012). A subset of these studies do not find any evidence 
for differential processing of social vs. nonsocial stimuli in 
individuals with ASD (Chita-Tegmark 2016). Importantly 
however, none of these studies have presented stimuli below 
the threshold of awareness, and thus the current paradigm 
provides a novel perspective to this set of observations on 
reduced preferential processing of social stimuli in ASD.
The ASD sample had longer/slower response times dur-
ing interocular suppression than our sample in Experiment 
1. However, the null effects in Experiment 2 are unlikely 
due to domain-general processes, such as slowed visual 
mechanisms or slowed motoric speed, as these factors 
should affect all stimulus categories equally. We discuss 
two possibilities below. First, if motoric slowness in the 
ASD group was responsible for the group difference, then 
one should expect the same pattern of social advantage in 
ASD participants as noted in Experiment 1, but at longer 
RTs for all conditions. We do not see such a pattern, and 
hence the evidence for this possibility is weak. Second, 
it is possible that the slowed motoric speed causes a ceil-
ing effect, which can arise if the magnitude of the social 
advantage effect is an order of magnitude smaller than the 
extent of motoric slowness in the ASD group. This second 
possibility also appears unlikely since the social advantage 
effect (~ 0.2 s) is not an order of magnitude smaller than 
the extent motoric slowness in the ASD group (~ 0.6 s). In 
light of these observations, we suggest that the elevated 
RTs for the ASD sample relative to the sample in Experi-
ment 1 is likely due to domain general processes associ-
ated with age.
The sample of ASD participants in the present experiment 
included, by chance, similar number of males and females. 
ASD tends to occur more frequently in males (Baron-Cohen 
et al. 2011), and there is evidence to suggest that social pro-
cessing in ASD somewhat depends on participants’ sex 
(Coffman et al. 2015). Although underpowered to explore 
in current experiment, sex differences in privileged process-
ing of social prioritisation may be a fruitful line of research 
in the future. As the participants in the current study were 
high-functioning, our results may not be generalizable to 
the ASD population as a whole. While all ASD participants 
had a verifiable clinical diagnosis using DSM criteria, some 
of them did not meet the cut-off score on the ADOS. This 
is not an uncommon observation, as the ADOS was neither 
developed nor optimised for diagnosing high-functioning 
adults with ASD, such as the participants in the current 
study. However, in order to ensure that none of the reported 
results are driven by the eight individuals who did not meet 
the cut-off score on ADOS, all analyses were rerun includ-
ing only participants who did so. This re-analysis revealed 
no significant difference in the results from those reported 
on the full sample.
Besides the implications of the current results for ASD, 
these experiments provide new insights into the process-
ing of complex social scenes in neurotypicals. Given that 
previous studies have found upright faces emerge from 
suppression more quickly than inverted faces (Gray et al. 
2013), and objects (Stein et al. 2012), it is unsurprising that 
social stimuli emerge more quickly than non-social stimuli. 
Previous findings have shown that complex visual scenes 
containing threat-related information are not preferentially 
processed over neutral scenes in CFS (Hedger et al. 2015). 
Using positively valenced visual scenes, ours is the first 
study to show the prioritisation of social content in CFS. 
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Social interactions often involve responding to very quick 
or subtle cues, and having privileged access to such cues can 
potentially result in more efficient planning of responses.
In conclusion, these two experiments demonstrate an 
advantage for rewarding social stimuli to receive prioritised 
visual processing compared to similarly valenced nonsocial 
stimuli. This difference is not explained by stimulus features, 
as inverted and negated versions of these stimuli do not 
show this observed advantage. Crucially, no such advantage 
for social stimuli is seen in individuals with ASD. These 
results are informative for the social motivation model of 
understanding the ASD phenotype, by providing fresh evi-
dence on the processing of social stimuli from early visual 
mechanisms.
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